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introduction
the existence of a ministry of defense (moD) is 
an important basic indicator of the quality of civil-
military relations in a country. although some of the-
se ministries are hardly more than facades, with no 
power whatsoever, others have assumed increasingly 
important roles as catalysts and platforms for the con-
solidation of democratic civil-military relations. this 
paper explains why they are created and identifies 
those conditions and actions necessary for the minis-
tries to formulate effective and efficient defense stra-
tegies while ensuring democratic civilian control.
a defense ministry is a core element in con-
temporary democratic civil-military relations. the 
moD structure has become widely viewed as the 
best solution to the classic paradox, “who guards the 
guardians?” If the accurate response is that democra-
tically elected civilians should be the ones to do the 
guarding against a military takeover, then a moD is 
the preferred mechanism to match the democratic 
legitimacy of elected civilians with the professional 
expertise of the military. most important issues in ci-
vil-military relations during the contemporary period 
of democratic consolidation are addressed within the 
form and functions of a moD.
Despite the importance of this topic, very little 
has been written about the role of ministries of de-
fense in democratic consolidation. While some of 
the lessons learned since the creation of the u.S. De-
partment of Defense in 1947 are relevant elsewhere, 
civilian control over the armed forces was never the 
challenge in the united States that it is for many of 
the “new democracies”.1 although most of the cen-
tral issues in civil-military relations are generic to 
any democracy, differences in history, the security 
environment, and institutional structures can be so 
vast that the lessons learned in the older democra-
cies often are not fully relevant to new ones. there is 
nothing in the current literature that defines what is 
required for a moD to combine political goals and 
considerations with military needs and objectives in 
an emerging democracy.2
In this chapter I draw information from first-hand 
observations in countries creating, or re-creating, a 
moD, and from interviews with civilian and military 
officials involved in the process. The purpose of this 
paper is to define the themes and issues surrounding 
the creation and role of moDs, rather than to suggest 
some kind of blueprint for quick success.3 It presents 
an approach that others might develop further and 
apply to important contemporary.
new institutionAlism
the literature in new institutionalism highlights 
a number of necessary considerations for understan-
ding the topic. the more important of these conside-
rations center on the often-forgotten fact that bureau-
cracies, here referred to as institutions, are crafted by 
humans at particular times, and with particular goals 
or purposes in mind. Scholars using this approach 
look to the conditions under which these institutions 
develop or wither, and their “stickiness” or resistance 
to change.4 Put simply, no two moDs are the same 
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in structure, process or practices. It is important for 
the researcher to grasp whether a moD does or does 
not have power, and extent of its roles and reach. 
this paper therefore looks at moDs as institutions 
that are either formal and without power or content, 
or alive and dynamic with the potential for further 
development.
Civil-Military Relations in Non-Democratic Regimes
to better understand the steps and challenges 
involved in establishing viable ministries of defense 
today, it is necessary to review briefly civil-military 
relations prior to democratization. By definition, the 
governments in question did not have functioning 
democratic institutions in place. those in power did 
not rely on popular support for their positions. ra-
ther, they tended overwhelmingly to rule by force, 
possibly with reference to nationalism or some other 
kind of ideology, which required the threat of and ca-
pability for suppression of dissent.5 While some au-
thoritarian regimes were run by civilians, in virtually 
all cases the armed services were a central element 
in the actual or potential use of repressive force. In 
most, though not all, countries, the primary function 
of the armed forces was domestic control.
the cold War both directly and indirectly in-
fluenced virtually all military roles and missions and 
civil-military relations throughout most of the world. 
In a context of war, even if “cold” the armed forces 
of many non-democratic countries found they could 
justify commandeering more resources, keeping a 
high degree of autonomy, and exerting great influen-
ce or even veto power over areas of state, economic 
and civil decision-making.
the armed services were not required to coordi-
nate their activities, cooperate with civilians, or ra-
tionalize their use of resources. after all, open-ended 
preparation for some possible future conflict can jus-
tify almost any level of funding and autonomy. and, 
within these largely authoritarian regimes, there was 
no public pressure to coordinate and economize in 
order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. These 
were largely alien concepts that did not figure into 
the public discourse, even if there was any.
Spread of Ministries of Defense in the Third Wave
In our contemporary era, most countries have 
created or reconstituted ministries of defense under at 
least formal civilian control. For example, Spain esta-
blished a moD in 1977 after the restoration of civilian 
rule in the country; in Portugal an old organization 
was redefined and brought under formal civilian con-
trol in 1982; argentina put its moD under civilian 
leadership in 1988; and colombia’s began to assume 
importance in 2000. In much of latin america, esta-
blishment of defense ministries under civilian control 
is a recent development: nicaragua (1997), honduras 
(1998) and Brazil (1999). nevertheless, the mere pre-
sence of a moD does not guarantee effective civilian 
control. nor, for that matter, does having a civilian mi-
nister of defense. Portugal had a moD that was in rea-
lity powerless until the late 1980s, while nicaragua’s 
remains very weak. the real question, then, is how do 
emerging democracies create moDs that have some 
potential for holding and exercising power, and thus 
providing a vehicle for democratic accountability and 
development of strategies to orient the armed forces 
for the benefit of the state as a whole?
Why have new (and not so new in the case of 
colombia) democracies created or brought their 
ministries of defense under formal civilian control? 
I find there are two main reasons for these changes. 
First, these developing states are following the exam-
ple of other, more established, democracies where 
civilians exercise control over the armed forces in or-
der to maximize military effectiveness. this could be 
termed the “demonstration effect”: civilian leaders 
are increasingly aware that the moD is currently 
viewed as an effective means to institute civilian 
control of the military. It is widely recognized that 
the armed forces rarely if ever acknowledge that they 
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have enough money to perform the functions assig-
ned to them by their civilian political leaders. If the 
armed forces are left to their own devices, which is 
generally the situation in authoritarian regimes, they 
work out deals or understandings among themselves 
whereby they inflate their requirements for all the 
services. this lack of accountability results in increa-
sed costs and the loss of any incentive to improve 
efficiency. An effective MOD appears to be the most 
appropriate institution for these purposes.
Second, in recognition of the general validity of 
this point, there is pressure from the more established 
democracies for the newer democracies to follow 
these models. This might be termed the “influence 
effect”. through regional security organizations and 
arrangements such as nato and the Partnership for 
Peace, the presence of u.S. regional “combat com-
manders”, and the external defense and defense coo-
peration programs of the united States and european 
democracies, there is strong encouragement for all 
countries to establish effective ministries of defense.6 
While, as noted above, little literature exists on the 
topic, there is nevertheless a widely-held if vague 
assumption that what has worked elsewhere, in the 
more established democracies, will also work in the 
new ones. consequently, the creation of ministries 
of defense is on the agenda of international assistan-
ce programs that influence democratic civil-military 
relations.
Four mAin PurPoses oF A mod
Based on first-hand observations in the new de-
mocracies attempting to deal with issues of civil-mi-
litary relations, it becomes apparent that moDs may 
fulfill four main purposes.
The first and most obvious purpose for a MOD 
is to structure the power relationships between de-
mocratically elected civilian leaders and the armed 
forces command. a moD is the vehicle whereby 
the relationships between those who hold the de-
mocratic right to formulate state policy and those 
who hold a monopoly on the means of violence are 
institutionalized. how civilians in different countries 
attain the right to rule, and whether they are in fact 
able to exercise it, varies tremendously. But once this 
right has been forged, a critical issue in consolidating 
democracy is how to bring the armed forces under 
control.7 although a moD is not only the currently 
favored but perhaps most indispensable institutional 
mechanism for establishing this control, by itself a 
MOD is not sufficient to guarantee democratic civi-
lian control of the military.8
the second purpose of the defense ministry is 
to define and allocate responsibilities between and 
among civilians and military officers. While this pur-
pose may seem straightforward in theory, it most de-
finitely is not in practice. Proof of this may be seen 
in the perpetual efforts by one of the most highly 
institutionalized democracy, the united States to sort 
out these relationships. the creation of the u.S. De-
partment of Defense in 1947, with later, and ongoing 
delineations of its responsibilities with regard to the 
armed services, were extremely complicated and 
highly political processes. the most recent of these 
reforms, the Defense reorganization act of 1986--
generally known as the goldwater-nichols act--was 
equally complicated and political. Indeed, it was 
imposed by congress over the resistance of both ci-
vilian and military leaders in the Department of De-
fense and some of the armed services.9
A key factor in the rational definition and alloca-
tion of responsibilities is the role a MOD fills as bu-
ffer between politics and the armed forces. this role 
may not initially be obvious, especially for countries 
that are not accustomed to having elected political 
figures lead important state institutions. The intent is 
that a political figure, selected to be defense minister 
through negotiations within the governing party or 
coalition of parties, or by presidential appointment, 
can represent the needs of the armed forces to other 
political figures, particularly the finance or econo-
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mics minister, and to the electorate in general. ha-
ving a civilian as the minister of defense can in fact 
be beneficial to the armed forces’ interests. It clearly 
is positive for the democracy, since it potentially re-
moves an obstacle to democratic legitimacy: that of 
having a non-elected organization using its bureau-
cracy, and quite possibly its monopoly of violence, to 
influence or even blackmail the political system.10
the third purpose in creating a moD is to maxi-
mize the effectiveness of employment of the armed 
forces. effectiveness in this case means the capaci-
ty to implement policies through the use of armed 
force. military bureaucracies are among the slowest 
to change due to the time-honored nature of their 
missions, entrenched career-promotion structures, 
and the huge investments and lead-time needed to 
develop new equipment and strategies. this issue of 
effectiveness may have been of marginal importan-
ce to some countries in the past, if there were either 
no real threat on the borders or where the military 
served to control and intimidate unarmed internal 
populations. the utility of the armed forces became 
open to question with the end of the cold War and 
its superpower alliance relations, the third Wave of 
democratization, and a general lessening of inters-
tate wars.
the question of effectiveness is particularly acu-
te today. In the current environment, where intras-
tate conflicts far outnumber interstate wars, many 
countries are embracing peacekeeping and peace-
making as a justifications for preserving their ar-
med forces. Successful execution of these missions, 
which include prominent roles for civilians, particu-
larly in foreign ministries, would be nearly impossi-
ble without the involvement of a MOD. Redefining 
old and implementing new roles and missions for 
the military demand another, higher-level civilian 
institution--a moD--to take the lead.11 What holds 
for peacekeeping, furthermore, will surely hold for 
counter-terrorism since the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, the Bali bombings in october 
2002, the bombings in madrid on 11 march 2004, 
right up to the present.
the fourth and last major purpose in creating a 
MOD is to maximize efficient use of resources (in-
cluding, funds, personnel, and equipment) as roles 
and missions change. Efficiency in this instance 
means the ability to achieve a goal at the lowest pos-
sible cost. In the pre-democratic phase, the different 
branches of the armed forces in many countries enjo-
yed tremendous independence, their missions often 
overlapped, and they maintained separate supply 
and training programs. most often, military budgets 
were secret, and even if they weren’t, ordinary citi-
zens had no mechanism by which to exert influence 
over allocations. today, the new forces of democra-
tization and globalization demand transparency, and 
previously acquired privileges and prerogatives are 
fading away.
With globalization, organizations such as the 
International monetary Fund, World Bank, north 
atlantic treaty organization (nato), and european 
union, individual states, and even individual inves-
tors demand convincing justification for any inves-
tment at all in national defense. consequently, with 
defense budgets dropping just about everywhere, the 
armed forces are under pressure to be as efficient as 
possible. the best vehicle, or at least locus of activi-
ty, for this kind of resource and asset management 
is a moD. Within the moD, civilian politicians can 
implement programs to ensure budget transparency, 
act as arbiter, minimize duplication among the servi-
ces, sell off unnecessary facilities, and negotiate with 
vendors of equipment and services.
mod comPetencies And eXternAl 
relAtions
If a MOD is to fulfill any of the four main tasks 
outlined above, we have found that it must be em-
powered with a number of basic competencies. Fur-
ther, its relations with other agencies must place it in 
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a position of relative authority. to expand on these 
issues, this section is divided into two main subdi-
visions: the first reviews the ministry’s four key com-
petencies, and the second specifies the four most 
important relations a functional moD must manage. 
the four key competencies a moD must master are 
in the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and 
definition of roles and missions. If a MOD does not 
have power or authority in these areas, it will have 
little real significance.
Budgets
It is trite but true that the “power of the purse” 
is the basis of civilian control of the armed forces. 
In authoritarian regimes, the defense budgets (and 
probably other budgets as well) were secret. Funds 
went directly to the armed forces, which enjoyed vir-
tually total autonomy to allocate within the services 
and other departments.12 the challenge lies in how 
to move from this situation to one where a civilian-
controlled moD assumes responsibility for budget 
development, resource allocation and oversight. It 
appears to be a very gradual process in which a moD 
and ministry of finance or equivalent body absorb 
the budget development and execution functions 
from the general staff, and divide the responsibilities 
between themselves. The ministry of finance makes 
the general allocations among the ministries, and the 
moD then allocates within the defense sectors. this 
immediately brings up the issue of how these alloca-
tions should be made. at a minimum, the adopted 
system must guarantee transparency, provide justifi-
cation for categories and funding levels, and assure 
accountability.
Definition of Roles and Missions
Roles and missions define the purposes for which 
the military exists at all. What are the armed forces 
to be used for and under what conditions? clearly, 
the answer is not what they were intended for du-
ring the cold War or under authoritarian regimes. 
In a democracy it should be democratically elected 
civilian leaders who finally determine national stra-
tegy and the functions of the armed forces.13 this res-
ponsibility becomes particularly crucial today with 
the new emphasis on complex, civilian-oriented 
peacekeeping missions, and risky counter-terrorism 
operations. these missions are of particular interest 
to civilians, not only with regard to civilian control 
of the armed forces, but also because involvement in 
either of them is an unwritten but widely understood 
requirement for membership in the ranks of respon-
sible nations. thus, it is all the more necessary for 
civilians to be aware, be in charge and actually de-
termine national strategy and roles and missions of 
the armed forces.
unfortunately, few moDs so far have proved able 
to develop strategies using the structures, processes 
and capabilities available to them. on top of this, 
general staffs, at least initially, tend to resist adopting 
clear definitions of roles and responsibilities, belie-
ving--correctly--that they are more likely to lose than 
gain power in an objective process of definition.
the same can be said regarding what are loo-
sely termed “military missions in support of civilian 
authorities”. these broad missions can range from 
disaster relief--volcanoes, floods, earthquakes and 
the like--to riot control, counter-drug operations, and 
counter-terrorism. For obvious reasons, the latter law 
enforcement-type examples are extremely sensitive 
issues, and are sometimes perceived as a return to 
the “bad old days”. these missions thus require very 
clear guidance, based on law and exercised through 
robust structures and processes, to ensure that the 
military executes the tasks without using them to 
usurp power.
Personnel
The issue of armed forces personnel, both offi-
cers and enlisted, is more complicated than it might 
initially appear. If a country’s armed forces were 
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founded under the conditions of the cold War and 
authoritarianism, then their composition and training 
in the new international order will have to change--
not necessarily larger or smaller numbers, but diffe-
rent in scope, function and complexity. the problem 
is, it is impossible to know a priori how they should 
change unless roles and missions are first defined, 
presumably through national security and national 
military strategies. calling upon its pool of civilian 
and military experts and the range of information 
available to it, the moD can determine force structu-
re by analyzing threats and vulnerabilities based on 
several factors, including specific scenarios, capabi-
lities, allocations by services, and fiscal caps. In the 
contemporary setting, there may seem to be little rea-
son for countries to use conscription to man their ar-
med forces. Indeed, as practiced in the united States 
during the war in Viet nam, and in colombia more 
recently, there is much to argue for all-volunteer for-
ces on the basis of equity as well as effectiveness. In 
some countries, however, concerns about cost, eth-
nic diversity and nation - building may overwhelm 
the arguments against conscription. What becomes 
clear is that there are many considerations involved 
in personnel planning and force structure, and that 
the past is not necessarily a good guide for the future. 
given the inherent conservatism of bureaucracies, 
especially military bureaucracies, these decisions 
should be made at the more general, higher level of 
a moD.
Acquisitions and Facilities
there are at least two generalizations that can be 
made regarding acquisitions in defense: they are very 
expensive, and the lead-time between procurement 
and final use can be considerable. It is thus all the 
more important that an efficient process be put in 
place to identify and acquire the most appropriate 
equipment. appropriateness must be determined by 
the missions for which the equipment and the forces 
will be committed, which in turn requires rational 
strategic and military decision-making. the acquisi-
tions process, which can involve enormous amounts 
of public money, often leads to graft and corruption, 
so the system must be especially transparent and ri-
gorous. Again, it is difficult to see how the armed 
forces’ bureaucracies alone can achieve the needed 
levels of openness and robustness. management of 
facilities also is an emerging issue, both because of 
the various requirements that may arise for the di-
fferent services according to their missions, and the 
fact that armed forces often accumulate installations 
over the years that may become unnecessary or ob-
solete. the question becomes how best to sell off or 
transfer these excess facilities and acquire new ones, 
or convert old ones to meet new needs. It is easy 
to imagine the opportunities for graft and corruption 
when selling off real estate in areas that have appre-
ciated tremendously, while the closing of facilities 
and subsequent job loss can have major implications 
for local politics. this activity requires attention at 
a bureaucratic level above the services command. 
a moD controlled by a democratically elected go-
vernment would be the most logical entity to deal 
with matters of appropriation and spending in order 
to avoid the temptation to divert government funds. 
good progress apparently has been made in argenti-
na and Portugal in this area.
these four key competencies obviously are not 
monopolies of a moD. a newly formed moD initia-
lly lacks the institutional foundation and expertise to 
exercise these responsibilities. If the MOD is to fulfill 
the purposes defined in the section above, however, 
it not only must create and build on a strong insti-
tutional structure, it must also be prepared to defi-
ne relationships with key elements of the domestic 
political system, the armed forces, and international 
actors.
internAl And eXternAl relAtions
there is a tremendous amount of institutional en-
gineering required to build the defense ministry, as 
well as all other basic institutions, of a new democra-
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cy. It is essential for the moD to establish functional 
relationships with other key agencies and actors as 
they, too, are developing. at a minimum there are 
four, and these must include parallel components of 
the executive, the legislature, the armed forces, and 
relevant international actors.
the moD is part of the executive branch of go-
vernment. While there are important differences in 
the structure of relations in presidential versus parlia-
mentary governments, the generalizations made here 
are meant to apply to both types of democratic poli-
tical systems, and thus are fairly generic. the funda-
mental issue is one of power, as it is in all aspects of 
civil-military relations. the question that must be an-
swered is whether the moD as an institution, and the 
minister of defense as an individual, have a central 
position in the power structure of a country, or is the 
moD only a façade and the minister without a strong 
political base? If the moD is not integrated into the 
executive cabinet, with clear lines of authority radia-
ting from the president or prime minister, and if the 
minister of defense is not politically powerful, then 
the MOD by definition is not a player in the political 
system. Building a moD requires establishing new 
institutions and lines of authority where previously 
there was nothing. If the moD and the defense mi-
nister are not closely linked to power, then either the 
armed forces continue to enjoy a great deal of au-
tonomy or there is some other institution within the 
executive branch that holds the power.
the ideal situation, at least in a new democracy, 
is one in which the moD and its minister are integra-
ted into the governmental power structure and hold 
the personal confidence of the executive. In this way, 
the armed forces know they are taken seriously on 
the one hand, and understand, on the other, that they 
must deal with the moD and not attempt to avoid 
its control.
after the executive, the second crucial relations-
hip for a new moD will be with the legislature. Whi-
le there are extremely important differences between 
a presidential and parliamentary system when it co-
mes to the role of the legislature, several of the po-
ints presented here can be applied to either political 
system.14 The most important consideration, first of 
all, is to broaden the interest of legislators and others 
in matters pertaining to the armed forces, national 
security and defense, beyond a typically small group 
in the executive branch. In most of these countries 
prior to democratization, few civilians had any in-
terest in or opportunity to deal with the armed forces 
beyond enlisted service. there was no advantage to 
such an interest, and it could be very dangerous. By 
bringing in the legislature, not only are expertise and 
the means for institutional control improved, but a 
broader group of politicians will take an interest in, 
and it is to be hoped, become experts on, issues of 
oversight and effectiveness. In Portugal, Spain and 
argentina, legislative defense committees were crea-
ted with some powers of policy and oversight, which 
encouraged the members to become interested and 
involved in military issues.
third, the moD obviously will have to work hard 
to define its relationship with the armed forces, so 
that elected civilians clearly and unambiguously are 
in charge. the moD’s counterpart will be some form 
of joint or general staff comprising the top ranks of 
the armed forces. In most cases, the moD will be 
taking over roles from the joint staff, so it is essential 
that the competencies of each be clearly defined.
From direct observation, it is apparent that the 
two primary functions to be clarified concern nomi-
nations for the highest military positions (the exe-
cutive nominates and the legislature approves), and 
operational roles. these in turn raise questions that 
will be critical to the delineation of roles and the 
distribution of power: 1) how are nominations for 
senior officers handled; and 2) Does the MOD play 
a central role in handling the candidates and making 
the nominations, or are nominations made strictly by 
the general or joint staff? If the moD takes the lead, 
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it will be able to influence not only the character of 
the higher officer ranks but also the behavior of those 
who aspire to higher ranks.
these are the new rules of the game that must 
be put in place, tested and subsequently reaffirmed 
and institutionalized. the issue here is not simply the 
power of the president or prime minister to promote 
or retire officers, which is a first sign of civilian con-
trol, but rather the proper management of personnel, 
including promotion of the best qualified officers to 
the highest positions.
The other area of responsibility to be defined, 
that of operational roles, concerns the division of 
command responsibility between the moD and the 
military staff in both peace and conflict. Ideally, the 
moD will have assumed the “support” roles of bud-
geting, supply, personnel management, training and 
the like, and the military staff will be fully responsi-
ble for operational roles. We have found that this de-
signation of responsibility is relatively clear-cut in the 
more advanced new democracies, such as Portugal 
and Spain, but is much less so in the less established 
democracies such as russia, Brazil and nicaragua.
Fourth and finally, MODs must develop good 
working relationships with the wide number and 
variety of international actors involved in interna-
tional defense and security, including civil-military 
relations. these can include, for example, other 
countries’ MODs, official groups and delegations, 
governmental organizations such as nato and the 
united nations, international military training and 
education programs, and non-governmental orga-
nizations such as humanitarian relief and refugee 
agencies that operate near war zones. the issue here 
is whether the armed forces, as individual services or 
through the general staff, should deal directly with 
them. again, from observation it seems clear that 
if the moD can monopolize its role as initial con-
tact, it will be better able to enhance its influence by 
mobilizing all the types of resources under ministry 
control: financial, personnel, training, and loans or 
grants of equipment. International donors can be an 
invaluable resource for defense rationalization and 
development, provided the moD can create structu-
res and processes for coordinating its relations with 
them. From our experience, very few moDs are able 
to do this. In most cases, the services are still in the 
lead but there is little coordination among them, 
much less with the moD.
unless and until at least these four sets of rela-
tionships are clarified, the MOD will be unable to 
fulfill the purposes for which it is created. Yet, defi-
ning and managing them demands knowledgeable 
and qualified personnel, resources a new MOD is 
unlikely to have. If, however, the executive branch 
will make the initial commitment, then the moD can 
develop infrastructure as it reworks these relations-
hips to its institutional advantage.
a moD will not be born, or reborn, with all of 
the key competencies and relationships defined, let 
alone developed. this section has outlined four com-
petencies and four relationships that we have found 
must be encouraged and finally institutionalized for 
a moD to be an effective governmental actor. In the 
more “mature” democracies such as France and the 
united States, ongoing adjustments, while important, 
take place at the margins. In the older “new demo-
cracies” of greece, Portugal, and Spain, these eight 
areas have developed to a reasonable level.15 argen-
tina, South africa, and the new nato members of 
the czech republic, hungary, and Poland are well 
along. Brazil is just beginning, but the situation is 
promising, as is the case in el Salvador. russia re-
mains mired in disorganization, while honduras and 
Nicaragua have recently begun to define the issues.16
initiAl reQuirements For institutionAl 
develoPment
a moD, like any institution, will grow or decline 
depending on the terms by which it was founded, and 
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the levels of support for or opposition to it within the 
government. Based on our observations and experien-
ce, there are three initial requirements that will allow 
a moD to begin to take on the kind of institutional 
life hypothesized throughout this chapter. First, moD 
managers must build workable structures and proces-
ses, supported by a firm legal status and resources. 
Second, the moD must be staffed with informed and 
responsible professional civilians, who can expect 
some degree of permanence in their positions. third, 
the moD will need a mechanism to incorporate mili-
tary officers and utilize their professional backgrounds 
and expertise to support ministry policymaking.
The first concern, creation of structures and pro-
cesses, is a minimum requirement for any institution. 
this demands a legal foundation, and at least a basic 
initial definition of what the institution’s competencies 
and relations will be. this can be embodied in some-
thing akin to an organic law, often following from the 
constitution, which also defines relationships to other 
institutions. even as fundamental a need as facilities 
can have strong political overtones. In the more suc-
cessful instances of institutional development that we 
have observed, the new moD will be located in the 
facilities originally inhabited by the services or jo-
int staff, a highly symbolic choice. as a corollary, of 
course, the moD must be adequately funded. this 
includes not only the funds to support the moD itself, 
which need not be great, but also the ministry’s pur-
view over resources for the armed forces in general. 
For example, despite its long history as a democra-
cy with civilian defense ministers, colombia’s moD 
does not in fact control these funds; the military staff 
maintains its monopoly over the allocation of military 
resources. this situation is now changing.
Second, the moD will require a professional 
civilian staff with some expectation of stability. as 
democratic control supplants the monopoly of the 
armed forces in the realms of national defense, civi-
lians will have to hold key positions in the moD. the 
dilemma, not surprisingly is that initially there will 
be few, if any, civilians who know anything about 
defense. therefore, civilians from other ministries, 
academics, lawyers, accountants and the like will 
have to be recruited into the moD and provided 
with the means to learn on the job, and through trai-
ning in-country and abroad. these training programs 
are available in the united States, Switzerland, and 
elsewhere, but each country must be willing to take 
advantage of them.
one almost insurmountable obstacle to the de-
velopment of a knowledgeable and dedicated staff is 
that most new democracies suffer from the noxious 
combination of an inadequate or nonexistent civil 
service system and the politicization of most govern-
ment positions. as a result, there is little prospect for 
stability in government employment because appo-
intments are at the whim of cronyism and nepotism. 
unless these problems are confronted, and at least to 
some degree resolved, there is little hope that quali-
fied civilians can be attracted or retained.17 Brazil has 
an advantage in this regard, as it possesses an objec-
tive and well-structured civil service system.
the third requirement is inclusion of both retired 
and active duty officers in the MOD. If, as is frequently 
the case in new democracies, the moD is staffed with 
active duty or retired officers, then there are fewer 
opportunities or incentives to include civilians. this 
type of staffing is frequently justified as a stopgap mea-
sure, but can easily become a permanent “solution” 
to the problem of informed personnel in the moD. 
after spending their careers in the armed forces of 
their countries, many of which lack vibrant civil so-
cieties and adequate economic options, military offi-
cers will continue to identify with the military culture 
and associate with their peers in the services, thereby 
weakening the emerging norm of civilian control.
the moD might include both active duty and 
retired officers, so that it may incorporate their pro-
fessional expertise into the policymaking functions 
of the ministry. It is essential for the new moD to 
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strike a balance between military and civilian per-
sonnel, so that each can be used to best advantage 
in fulfilling the ministry’s various missions, and with 
the intention that officers will train their civilian 
counterparts in the issues pertaining to the military. a 
plausible model would be to assign a military officer 
as deputy to each senior civilian within the ministry, 
and a civilian deputy to each senior military officer 
within the ministry.
resPonsiBilities For Future initiAtives
Whether there is a moD or not, whether it pos-
sesses scant or abundant resources initially, and the 
nature of its competencies and relationships, will 
depend on the initiative of the government’s executi-
ve branch and possibly the legislature. the southern 
european democracies, new members of nato, 
argentina and South africa have seen their moDs 
accumulate new competencies and define or redefi-
ne their relations with other political institutions and 
foreign actors. these developments have been made 
possible through founding statutes, strong leadership 
early on, and effective bureaucratic dynamics. the 
moD itself needs to have a role in initiating and 
formalizing these new and changing roles, especia-
lly in the legal realm. Key types of legislation, from 
most general to most specific, include: changes in 
the constitution relating to the moD and the armed 
forces; an organic law or laws determining the com-
position of the moD itself and possibly the general 
staff; regular legislation pertaining to defense and the 
armed services; and ongoing policy initiatives of the 
executive. If the ministry has a role in defining its fu-
ture legal status, it will be better able to accumulate 
responsibilities and establish itself as a viable insti-
tution in the constellation of powers including the 
executive, legislature, and armed forces.
In sum, these three initial requirements must 
be met to increase the chances that the moD will 
become capable of fulfilling the purposes for which 
it has been created. all of them demand adequate 
resources,--political, human and financial--some-
thing in limited supply in any democracy, particu-
larly new ones. If political leaders are not committed 
to developing the institution of a moD and providing 
it with these resources, however, then it is difficult to 
imagine how democratic civil-military relations can 
be established or maintained.18
conclusion
This paper finally is about the politics of the 
management of defense. In the contemporary 
process of democratic consolidation, the issues 
of civil-military relations become less about the 
likelihood of military coups and more about ins-
titutionalizing effective and durable relations 
between democratically elected civilians and the 
armed forces. It is about how to manage the diffi-
cult relationship between democratic legitimacy 
and professional military expertise. Based on our 
observations, most new democracies have similar 
reasons for creating an effective moD, and recog-
nize a common series of responsibilities that must 
be defined and implemented. These will demand 
a substantial commitment of human, financial and 
political capital. If policymakers are interested 
in achieving civilian control of the armed forces 
and maintaining credible defenses, this chapter 
can serve as an inventory of what is required. It is 
clear that emerging democracies will be unable to 
formulate a national security and military strategy 
without a moD in place, but policymakers may 
not be interested in either of these goals. If so, this 
paper allows for assessments of what has not been 
done. For those who do wish to establish strong 
civilian control over the armed forces, however, 
the domestic resources of political capital, energy, 
funds and personnel can be supplemented with in-
ternational programs for training and education.
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